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Interpretations of Kant’s notion of autonomy that are
“relational”—that is to say, that locate its fundamental context in
terms of an individual moral agent’s relationship to others in society—
are no longer as problematic as they once seemed.1 Still, the strength
and persistence of a view that sees Kantian autonomy as
“individualist,” or as standing in fundamental tension with the roles
and relationships that are constitutive of an agent’s membership in a
community, requires that an account be given of why a relational
rather than an individualist reading more adequately represents Kant’s
own view of autonomy.2 What I thus propose to do in this note is
simply to provide what I consider to be one important indication that
Kant deeply embeds both his understanding of reason and its moral
function in the context of human social interaction. I shall do so by
drawing attention to a passage from the Critique of Pure Reason—“The
discipline of pure reason with regard to its polemical use”
(A738/B767–A757/B785)—that is rarely given consideration in
discussions of Kant’s moral thought, even though it bears quite directly
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on the question of the extent to which there is a social character to his
understanding of reason and the full range of its exercise.3 I draw
attention to this passage precisely because I believe it offers useful
support for the view that Kant sees autonomy as fundamentally—and
appropriately—a function of a relationality that is proper to human
moral agency.4 If this is so, then in proposing autonomy as the proper
characterization of human moral freedom, Kant at least implicitly
affirms it as the social character of the self-governance of reason—an
affirmation that he will later more fully articulate in concepts such as
the highest good, the ethical commonwealth, and the cosmopolitan
perspective.
Before looking at this passage and its import for a relational
understanding of autonomy, it will be useful to consider some of the
factors that lie behind the strength and persistence of an individualist
reading of this concept. While it may be the case that some of these
factors have their origin in the cultural dynamics of the individualism
that has arisen from more than two centuries of interplay between
democratic polities with market and consumer economies, the ones
most pertinent to my argument are those which can be located within
Kant’s own texts. The strength and the persistence of this individualist
reading has its origin in the fact that Kant does treat the notion of
autonomy in ways that do provide a basis for it. There is no doubt, for
instance, that Kant takes autonomy to be crucial to the full integrity of
the individual choices that one makes as a moral agent: if we are to
exercise autonomy, no one else can do our choosing for us. There is
also little doubt that in the Kantian texts which have become standard
reading for courses in ethics—most notably the second part of The
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals—Kant does not make it all
that evident, save in the image of the kingdom of ends, that autonomy
can be, let alone should be, appropriately rendered as an account of
the social self-governance of reason. He offers what has often been
taken to be a picture of moral decision-making in which an individual
moral agent makes choices that seem not to be at all affected by the
concrete features of our human condition, such as one’s relation to
other human beings in the specific society of which one is a member.
One makes one’s decisions as an abstract member of a timeless
“intelligible world” standing, at best, in an abstract, formal relation
with an equally abstract set of fellow members of that world.5
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The strength of this individualist reading of Kant’s notion of
autonomy, however, rests to a large degree, first, on detaching the
arguments of the Groundwork from the larger conceptual structure of
Kant’s critical project and, second, on taking this text as Kant’s
definitive statement on moral philosophy. What the Groundwork
represents, however, is an intermediate—albeit quite significant—
exposition of a still developing account of moral life that undergoes
further refinement and even significant revision for more than another
decade. One consequence of this isolation of the concepts and
arguments of the Groundwork from both their systematic context in
the critical project and their place in the historical development of
Kant’s thinking is that this text is read without reference to his first
efforts to envision the form and function of a critical exposition of
morality in the first Critique, or indeed to his later treatments,
sometimes strikingly different from those in the Groundwork, of the
same central issues in other texts from the late 1780s and throughout
the 1790s. When the Groundwork is read in the wider context provided
by other major texts from different stages of Kant’s exposition of the
critical project, however, one begins to see the lineaments of a more
complex account of moral agency and autonomy than that provided by
individualist readings focused principally on this one work. One striking
way in which the picture becomes more complex is that reference to
this larger array of texts brings into higher relief the social
embeddedness of moral agency and autonomy that Kant only hints at
in the text of the Groundwork with the image of the “kingdom of
ends.”
A key initial point of reference for Kant’s earlier efforts to
provide a critical exposition of morality is a passage from the “Canon
of Pure Reason” (A 808/B 836) in which Kant first defines a “moral
world” as “the world as it would be if it were in conformity with all
moral laws (as it can be in accordance with the freedom of rational
beings and should be in accordance with the necessary laws of
morality).” He then refers to the “objective reality” of this world as an
“object of reason in its practical use” and “a corpus mysticum of the
rational beings in it, insofar as their free choice under moral laws has
thoroughgoing systematic unity in itself as well as with the freedom of
everyone else.” A few pages later he further explains the
interconnectedness of the agents in this “moral world” by reference to
Leibniz’s concept of a “realm of grace”:
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Leibniz called the world, insofar as in it one attends only to
rational beings and their interconnection in accordance with
moral laws under the rule of the highest good, the realm of
grace, and distinguished it from the realm of nature, where, to
be sure, rational beings stand under moral laws but cannot
expect any successes for their conduct except in accordance
with the course of nature in our sensible world. Thus to regard
ourselves as in the realm of grace, where every happiness
awaits us as long as we ourselves do not limit our share of it
through the unworthiness to be happy, is a practically necessary
idea of reason (A 812/B 840).
These passages anticipate elements that eventually will enter into
Kant’s account of critique as the social self-governance of reason—for
example, the kingdom of ends, the object of practical reason, radical
evil, the formulation of the universal principle of justice. They also
suggest, as well, some problems that recur in his later development of
that account—for instance, the moral function of the ends of action,
moral “weakness” and “impurity” in relation to “radical evil,” and, most
notably, the relation between nature and freedom in terms of what he
calls here the “realm of nature” and the “realm of grace”—not all of
which he is later able to bring to a satisfactory resolution. Of the
elements in these passages, the ones that I believe bear most directly
upon an articulation of the social character of autonomy are those
which express Kant’s understanding both of the unity of reason and of
the comprehensive unifying dynamic of reason, an understanding that
he images and conceptualizes in terms such as “world” and “realm” (or
“kingdom”).
To understand how Kant’s use of this terminology bears on the
notion of autonomy as the social self-governance of reason, it is crucial
to recall that Kant takes reason itself to be a mark of the
interrelatedness of the beings who exercise it. Put in most direct
terms, any “world” that human reason constructs will have to have the
character of being a social world. Kant gives clear affirmation of this in
the first Critique, in the second section of the first chapter of the
“Doctrine of Method,” a discussion that carries the title, “The discipline
of pure reason with regard to its polemical use.” Two passages are of
particular relevance, since they each use the establishment and
operation of civic order in society as an extended image for the critical
use of reason. The first is the opening paragraph of the section:
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Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and
cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition
without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a
disadvantageous suspicion. Now there is nothing so important
because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted
from this searching review and inspection, which knows no
respect for persons. The very existence of reason depends upon
this freedom, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose
claim is never anything more than the agreement of free
citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations,
indeed even his veto, without holding back (A738–39/B 766–
67).
The second passage is part of a later discussion in the same section in
which Kant offers a defense of what he will later term the “public use
of reason”:
Without this [the critique of reason as the true court of justice],
reason is as it were in the state of nature, and it cannot make
its assertions and claims valid or secure them except though
war. The critique, on the contrary, which derives all decisions
from the ground rules of its own constitution, whose authority
no one can doubt, grants us the peace of a state of law, in
which we should not conduct our controversy except by due
process. What brings the quarrel in the state of nature to an end
is a victory, of which both sides boast, although for the most
part there follows only an uncertain peace, arranged by an
authority in the middle; but in the state of law it is the verdict,
which since it goes to the origin of the controversies itself, must
secure a perpetual peace (A751–52/B 779–80).
As Onora O’Neill ably argued, the juridical and political imagery
that runs deeply throughout Kant’s writings needs to be taken as a
particularly revealing clue to his thinking about the nature and function
of human reason.6 The passages just cited from the first Critique offer
just such a clue. They indicate that we would not be far off the mark in
taking Kant to understand critique as the very process by which reason
(freely) brings itself to be exercised socially—and consequently to
understand autonomy as the exercise of the freedom by which reason
acknowledges and takes upon itself the task of being governed
socially. If this is so, there is all the more reason to agree with
O’Neill’s assessment that autonomy is at the very heart of critique and
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to urge, perhaps even more strongly than she does, that critique is
itself a social task:
Critique of reason is possible only if we think of critique as
recursive and of reason as constructed rather than imposed. The
constraint on possibilities of construction is imposed by the fact
that the principles are to be found for a plurality of possible
voices or agents who share a world. Nothing has been
established about principles of a cognitive order for solitary
beings.7
A similarly strong and explicit stress on the social character of
reason, however, is not immediately evident in the Groundwork—
although I believe one could argue that it is implicit in the confidence
that Kant exhibits throughout that work and, indeed, throughout his
moral philosophy in the reliability of ordinary moral judgment.8 In the
development of his arguments in the Groundwork, Kant’s explicit focus
simply is on matters other than the way in which the newly introduced
concept of autonomy expresses the fundamentally social character of
reason. Yet it not difficult to find key elements in his arguments at
least presuppose, if not explicitly confirm, the social character of this
moral exercise of reason. A particularly clear statement of this is in the
affirmation of morality as “the lawgiving by which alone a kingdom of
ends is possible”9 —a description that, in slightly different terminology,
echoes what he had written in the “Canon of Pure Reason” about the
social character of the world that is to be effected by the moral
exercise of reason. In characterizing the moral exercise of reason as
autonomy, Kant quite evidently highlights the fact that responsibility
for the appropriate moral exercise of reason rests squarely in the
hands of individual moral agents—and this is the aspect of his
discussion that gives much of the persuasive power to what I have
termed “individualist” understandings of autonomy. Yet by affirming,
in the concept of autonomy, each individual agent’s responsibility for
the exercise of reason, Kant neither denies nor weakens his prior
claims about the social character of reason. His strong affirmation of
individual responsibility here, moreover, does bring to light an issue
that plays a role in his later development of the notion of the “highest
good.” That issue is the precise character of the bearing that an
individual’s appropriate exercise of moral reason then has upon
effecting the highest good in its social form. Full exploration of that
issue, which I believe would further bolster the claim that Kant takes
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the full scope of autonomy to consist in the social self-governance of
reason, lies beyond the scope of this note.

Notes
See, for instance, Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge/New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 374: “Kant holds that just because
‘thinking for oneself’ claims universal rational validity, this thinking
must also strive to ‘think from the standpoint of everyone else,’ which
is possible for beings like ourselves through free communication
between people…I submit that any interpretation of Kant that takes
account of his conception of reason as grounded on public
communication must display Kantian autonomy as intersubjective
already.”
2
The controversy between “liberals” and “communitarians” over a range of
questions in political and social philosophy is one place in which this
kind of issue has been recently been played out—though usually
without much consideration of the question as to whether the concepts
and arguments employed by either of the contending views adequately
represent Kant’s own thinking about autonomy. Both sides have
commonly taken it for granted that Kant’s reading of moral agency—
and, a fortiori, the autonomy which is its central conceptual element—
has a deeply ingrained individualist cast to it (or, as some parties to
the controversy have termed it, that it provides a “thin” account of
moral agency.)
3
The Critique of Pure Reason is cited by use of the standard convention of
referring to the first (A) and second (B) editions of the German text.
Translations are from Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and
Allen Wood, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant
(Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
4
In the “Introduction” to their translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, Paul
Guyer and Allen Wood draw attention to this section as one that
“provides an ardent defense of freedom of public communication” and
that also “presages Kant’s impassioned defense of freedom of thought
in his political writings of the 1790s” (p. 19). Their notice of this
passage suggested to me that it may also have bearing on Kant’s
account of autonomy.
5
See, for instance, Iris Murdoch’s classic portrait of the “Kantian” moral agent
in The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Shocken, 1971), 79–80, which
concludes: “Kant’s man had already received a glorious incarnation
nearly a century earlier in the work of Milton: his proper name is
Lucifer.” In a less dramatic vein, Martha Nussbaum, in commenting on
John Rawls’ Kantian construal of moral agency, observes: “This
1
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interpenetration between person and nature is not imagined as going
very deep, in the sense that once necessary things are at hand, all is
well. No deeper consideration of the structure of relatedness between
persons and things—or, indeed, persons and one another—is called for
by the Kantian idea of the person” (“Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in
Liberalism and the Good, ed. R. Bruce Douglas, Gerald M. Mara, and
Henry S. Richardson [London/New York: Routledge, 1990], 203–52, at
243).
6
See “Reason and Politics in the Kantian Enterprise,” in Onora O’Neill,
Constructions of Reason (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), 3–27.
7
Ibid, 27.
8
See Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory (Cambridge/New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4–6.
9
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Immanuel Kant, Practical
Philosophy, trans. Mary Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of
Immanuel Kant (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 84. The passage cited can be found in Kant’s Gesammelte
Schriften, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902–), IV, 434.
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